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Abstract
In the ML fairness literature, there have been few investigations through the view-
point of philosophy, a lens that encourages the critical evaluation of basic assump-
tions. The purpose of this paper is to use three ideas from the philosophy of sci-
ence and computer science to tease out blind spots in the assumptions that underlie
ML fairness: abstraction, induction, and measurement. Through this investigation,
we hope to warn of these methodological blind spots and encourage further inter-
disciplinary investigation in fair-ML through the framework of philosophy.
1 Introduction
Though the original intent of incorporating machine learning (ML) in human decision-making was
to remove human bias, domain applications from criminal justice to hiring have shown that ML
might actually exacerbate bias (Hardt and Barocas [2017]). This spurred “fair machine learning,”
the paradigm of creating ML systems with these biases in mind. In the recent fair ML litera-
ture, various mathematical definitions of fairness abound. However, despite being internally con-
sistent through the math, each definition assumes a different philosophical view on fairness (Binns
[2017]). For instance, should algorithms give every group the same probability for certain outputs
(Julia Angwin and Kirchner [2016])? Or should they instead strive to reduce negative impacts on
more disadvantaged groups (William Dieterich and Brennan [2016])? These questions remind us
of much older (unsolved) thought in moral philosophy on what “fairness” means in the first place.
Thus, it is clear that committing to a fairness definition necessarily forces us to commit to a strong
normative view on a definition of fairness. This suggests an alternate philosophical approach – focus
on the assumptions and methodology behind ML instead of the existing "solutions."
In this paper, we turn our eyes to the methodological assumptions behind ML through the lens of
philosophy. We find three methodological "blind spots" through philosophy: abstraction, induction,
and measurement. By reframing the investigation as such, we adopt a more holistic approach to
fairness that keeps in mind necessary human and societal actors.
2 Fairness as a Context-Sensitive Value
Before exploring the methodological blind spots in fair-ML, we first make an assumption on the
nature of fairness as a value. This initial assumption stems from the intuition that a “fair” ML system
must take into account its context and environment (Andrew D. Selbst [2018]). A "value" is defined
in the theory of value in moral philosophy, which is broadly concerned with “which things are good
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or bad and how good or bad are they” (Hirose and Olson [2015]). A value X should conform to
questioning howX something is. For the value of justice, we might ask, “How just is this law?” For
our purposes, we define a context-sensitive value, a value that yields different evaluations depending
on context. Take the value of usefulness. When we say something is useful, it seems intuitive that
how useful that thing is depends on the surrounding context. For instance, suppose we compare
the usefulness of a chair in a bare room to the last open chair at a table during dinner. In the latter
context, the chair is clearly more useful, though both contexts concern the value usefulness.
In fair-ML, we argue that fairness is one of these context-sensitive values because of ML’s main goal
– prediction of phenomena via mathematical formalization on large amounts of data. The “contexts”
when implementing fair ML include, but are not limited to: the societal context, the application
domain, the data acted upon, the stakeholders, and the algorithms involved. Because the “context”
here might be more difficult to parse than in our trivial chair example, we provide an example.
Suppose an algorithm with the fairness definition of Equalized Odds, which equalizes false positive
rates between two groups. Then, suppose two application contexts: hiring and criminal recidivism.
For hiring, a false-positive (someone unfit for the job is employed) is less harmful than a false-
negative (someone fit for the job is denied). An unfit, accepted applicant might just get fired, while
there is no “second chance” for a fit but unaccepted applicant. However, in criminal recidivism,
equalized false-positivesmight keepmore of a minority populationmistakenly in jail, propagating an
existing injustice. Instead, we might use a different fairness definition altogether for recidivism. Our
single mathematical formalization fails to generalize to different social contexts (Andrew D. Selbst
[2018]). Fairness might also be sensitive to the context of time. Our notions of what is fair drastically
evolve over time periods or societal eras. Thus, fairness in the specific domain of fair-ML is a
context-sensitive value.
3 Blind Spot 1: Abstraction
The first blind spot fair ML has with respect to context-sensitive fairness is abstraction, an integral
tenet in the philosophy of computer science. In ML, mathematical abstractions allow models to
become black-boxes. Here, we focus on two aspects of abstraction: specification and modularity.
First, the notion of specification in fair-ML is too narrow for context-sensitive fairness. Any algo-
rithm involves a specification – a description of its inputs and outputs. A simple specification might
be "input x and output its square, x2." Well-defined specifications allow “black box” abstractions
to build into complex systems. In fair-ML, we might have the standard specification of optimizing
a loss function with the additional specification of a fairness constraint. We argue that this is not
enough – fairness requires a human, normative specification, with respect to the semantics of fair-
ness in a context. A mathematical formulation of fairness provides only the syntax. For instance,
some fairness constraint might "equalize false positive rates," but true fairness calls for a norma-
tive specification: "...assuming equal false positive rates are acceptable due to the moral motivation
for long-run diversity between groups A and B." Without this, ML algorithms are merely "symbol-
crunching," as Searle argues in his famous Chinese Room Argument – while machines might use
syntactic rules to manipulate symbols, they cannot grasp semantic values (Searle [1984]). To get
past "just doing the math” of fairness, human domain experts in the loop are necessary to provide
concrete normative specifications.
Second, abstraction’s end goal of modularity (allowing for the "plug and play" necessary for com-
plex computer systems) runs counter to context-sensitive fairness. In ML, problems are character-
ized by their nature of learning task, and a specific set of established methods (e.g. SVM, nearest
neighbors) are implemented as single line imports in ML libraries (e.g. scikit-learn, TensorFlow).
Some fair ML applications even utilize a "fair wrapper" to encourage a modular approach for fair-
ness (Andrew D. Selbst [2018]). However, modularity and context-sensitive "fairness" are mutually
exclusive. Given an ML system with satisfactory fairness constraints in a specific context, we can-
not ship it to another context and expect it to still be "fair." For instance, suppose a fair system that
equalizes false positive rates for hiring by fulfilling all normative assumptions for fairness in hiring.
We cannot simply "export" it to the domain of criminal justice, where the normative value of a false
positive is far different.
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4 Blind Spot 2: Induction
The second blind spot is induction, a central problem in the philosophy of science. Induction is the
principle that future unexperienced instances of something resemble those of which we have had
experience. Hume posed the unsolved "problem of induction" – inductive patterns are no more than
"habits of the mind," and there is no necessary connection between observations and unseen events
(Hume [2009]). This led to Nelson Goodman’s "new riddle of induction," (Goodman [1983]) which
we use to motivate how the problem of induction affects ML. Goodman proposes the thought exper-
iment: suppose that, up to time t, we have observed many green emeralds and no emeralds other
than green ones. He makes a first hypothesis: "All emeralds are green." Goodman then introduces
the predicate "grue": an object is "grue" if, observed before a time t, it is green, but, after t, it is blue.
Note that the observations also fulfill, "emerald x before time t is "grue." Thus, Goodman makes
another hypothesis: "All emeralds are grue." Goodman’s two hypotheses are equally supported by
the data, given our new predicate, but “All emeralds are green" expects the next emerald to be green,
while "All emeralds are grue" expects the next to be blue. Therein lies the problem – for the same
set of data, how do we distinguish the good inductions from the bad inductions? Intuitively, "all
emeralds are green" is a better induction, but with just the data and hypotheses at hand, there is
nothing to necessitate this.
Learning theory (the mathematical theory behind ML) answers Goodman’s problem with its corner-
stone assumption: Occam’s Razor, the principle that one should choose the simplest explanation
of a phenomenon compatible with one’s experiences. This allows for "All emeralds are green."
Then, because learning theory is the study of "computational strategies for converging to the truth,"
(Harizanov [2017]) the Occam’s Razor assumption conflates the most truth-conducive hypothesis
with the simplest. This embeds a crucial philosophical assumption deep into ML’s theoretical under-
pinnings. Indeed, attempts in the growing field of ML interpretability have begun to grapple with
this blindspot (Ribeiro et al. [2016], Doshi-Velez and Kim [2017]).
In fair-ML, Occam’s Razor conflicts with context-sensitive fairness in three ways. First, ML systems
generalize the "simplest explanation" of historical trends in data that may have a normatively charged
context. For instance, suppose ML for hiring in a workplace using past resume data, where the past
twenty years have been wrought with gender bias against women. Following Occam’s Razor, our
algorithm hypothesizes the simplest explanation that "women perform worse," because the training
data’s most expressive signal is that women do not get hired. This clearly conflicts with context-
sensitive fairness if our context is a society that aims to progress from past injustices prevalent in all
previously observed instances. Second, learning-theoretic induction might fail us when ML picks
up on nonsensical trends in data. Take a recent ML paper that created a highly accurate classifier
for criminals using only portraits (Wu and Zhang [2016]). A rebuttal found that this algorithm sim-
ply classified criminals with high accuracy based on whether they frowned in their portraits. Here,
Occam’s Razor allows potentially unfair inductive hypotheses through highly expressive and "sim-
ple," yet nonsensical trends in the data. Third, Occam’s Razor has no robustness against feedback
loops. In a well-known example, predictive policing might use arrest records to predict the location
of new crimes and determine police deployment. But this causes increased surveillance and, with
it, arrest records on those very neighborhoods (Barocas et al. [2019]). Here, feedback loops cause
an algorithm to pick up on the simplest, feedback-amplified hypothesis from the data, but the more
complex hypothesis (that there is a feedback loop), remains undetected until human intervention.
5 Blind Spot 3: Measurement
In the philosophy of science and epistemology, measurement is rich grounds for philosophical in-
quiry. Measured data is central to ML before any algorithm is even implemented, so the crucial
question is: how do we measure this data? The dominant theory of measurement is the representa-
tional theory of measurement (RTM) (David H. Krantz [1990]). RTM formalizes measurement as
the construction of mappings from empirical structures to formal structures. This mapping is known
as a scale. For instance, we might try to measure wooden rods A and B. To construct a scale, we
might define that rod A is longer than rod B if, when one of the ends of each rod are aligned, the
other end of rod A extends past rod B. This is the empirical relationship of "longer." By assigning
real numbers to the rods and the symbol > to the relationship "longer" we may write A > B as the
formal relationship. Here, our empirical assumption in the mapping is a relatively harmless proce-
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dure to distinguish the relationship of "longer" – namely, putting the rods flush to each other – but
it is an assumption, nonetheless. In measurement, these assumptions are necessary. We show that
these assumptions can conflict with context-sensitive fairness in more complex examples.
With RTM in mind, we first argue that not all formal scales can be liberally “statisticized." Because a
scale is a mapping from the empirical to the formal, different empirical relationships admit different
formal scales (e.g. nominal, ordinal, interval). However, some scales do not admit of common
statistical techniques (Hardt and Barocas [2017]). For instance, restaurant reviews may be measured
on an ordinal scale from 1 to 5. In an ordinal scale, a 2 is better than a 1, and so forth, but just
how much better is an undefined quantity. We only have an ordering of objects. Because of this,
taking basic statistical operations such as the mean or standard deviation is fundamentally a category
error (Hardt and Barocas [2017]), as they work with more than just ordering. Despite this, data in
many ML applications might be on an ordinal scale (e.g. restaurant reviews, movie ratings, patient
surveys). By imposing a scale on empirical phenomena, we risk assumptions that are incompatible
with ML, and, by applying invalid operations on these biased assumptions, fair-ML systems face a
serious methodological issue.
Second, on the empirical side of measurement, data features and labels often come from measuring
elusive empirical concepts. In fair-ML, measuring data features oftentimes means measuring fea-
tures related to humans. For instance, an ML system for hiring might want to measure empirical
features such as intelligence and communicability. Possible measures of such traits might be an IQ
test or a written sample. But who decides the measurement, and how do we know if an IQ test is
a good measurement of intelligence? And how do we score a writing sample without introducing
reader bias? In many cases, the data features of our inputs already incorporate context dependent
assumptions. As Moritz Hardt put it in NIPS 2017, "every feature is a model" (Hardt and Barocas
[2017]). That is, features incorporate important normative and subjective context-dependent as-
sumptions about measurements, but all features are treated as numerical truth by ML systems. This
also applies to the labels in supervised learning, as they are often constructs created only for the
purpose at hand. For instance, when building an ML system for job performance, we might only
have the proxy of historical performance reviews (Barocas et al. [2019]). However, historical perfor-
mance might admit all sorts of biases, such as the culture of past managers or different teams in the
workplace. Thus, in both features and labels, context is crucial to understanding the measurements
involved, as training data is given as "ground truth" for ML models. However, there is no current
approach of encoding contexts themselves into ML features or labels. Nascent empirical attempts to
survey actual human judgment on the fairness of training features have shown that human evaluation
reveals numerous concerns that the normative attempts at fairness in the literature have not yet grap-
pled with (Grgic´-Hlacˇa et al. [2018]). Without some incorporation of context, these applications fail
to satisfy context-sensitive fairness.
6 Conclusion and Suggestions
We have shown three methodological objections to fair-ML from philosophy: abstraction, induction,
and measurement. These objections stem from the assumption that fairness is a context-sensitive
value, and, as such, avoids capture through methods such as simply specifying a “one-size-fits-all”
definition of fairness (abstraction) or assuming we have well-measured data (measurement). We
conclude with three broad suggestions for ways in which ML researchers, philosophers, and domain
experts might approach fair-ML in a way that embraces the context-sensitivity of fairness and begin
to assuage these deep-rooted philosophical issues.
First, abstraction in fair-ML should begin the iterative process with normative assumptions. Fair
ML systems cannot iterate just on the technical portion of the process, driving up accuracy until
we notice some societally unfavorable result. Instead of checking for normative assumptions and
fairness at the end of the pipeline, domain experts and ML practitioners should incorporate context-
dependent normative assumptions into the initial specifications of the system. This interdisciplinary
approach integrates human domain experts who truly understand the context of the system as neces-
sary, ensuring that values are not lost in the process before abstraction takes place.
Second, when fairness is involved in induction, the simplest inductive patterns are not always the
fairest. By better understanding that the simplest induction is not always the fairest induction
when we review the context of each case in fair-ML, ML practitioners and domain experts alike
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must engage in dialogue about possible alternative hypotheses on the data. This requires an open-
mindedness to the wide universe of “not-so-simple” hypotheses (historical trends, feedback loops)
and cases where (as proposed in Section 4) emeralds are actually “grue” instead of “green.”
Third, take a closer look at the measurement of data, the representation of those measurements, and
question “ground truth.” A better understanding of measurement as a subjective mapping from the
empirical to the formal might inspire deeper inquisition into the measurement of certain labels or
features in data. In the domain of fair-ML, this is especially important, as, oftentimes, the traits we
must measure are human or social traits that elude simple formal schemes. Again, open dialogue
is needed between domain experts, ML practitioners, and, very importantly, social scientists (who
have better understanding of how human qualities can be quantified) to take a closer look at the ways
we measure our data and come up with ways to improve.
While technical and concrete solutions await, the advantage of philosophy is that it allows us to
revisit our assumptions, see our blind spots, and recognize when we might be “losing the forest for
the trees.” We can only hope that, moving forward, philosophy is a more widely used tool in ML to
tease out and question its most basic assumptions.
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